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GRAVESIDE BIRTHDAY PARTIES: THE
LEGAL CONSEQUENCES OF FORMING
FAMILIES POSTHUMOUSLY
Browne Lewist
INTRODUCTION
As a result of reproductive technology, procreation is no longer
left to the living. Assisted reproduction has enabled infertile couples,
single people, and same-sex couples to create families with children.'
Traditionally, a family consisted of a husband, a wife and their
adopted or biological children.2 High divorce rates led to single
3parent families and blended families consisting of stepchildren. As a
result of the sexual revolution, some families were made up of a man,
his "old lady," and their non-marital children. More recently, the
discovery of effective methods to extract and freeze sperm has also
allowed some individuals to engage in posthumous reproduction.
t Associate Professor & Director, Center for Health Law & Policy, Cleveland-Marshall
College of Law, Cleveland State University; B.A., Grambling State University; M.P.A., Hubert
Humphrey Institute of Public Affairs; J.D., University of Minnesota School of Law; L.L.M.,
Energy & Environmental Law, University of Houston College of Law. Special thanks to my
scholarship support group: Professors Heidi Robertson, Alan Weinstein, Dena Davis, Kermit
Lind, and Kristina Niedringhaus.
I See Crystal Liu, Note, Restricting Access to Infertility Services: What Is a Justified
Limitation on Reproductive Freedom? The Categorical Exclusion of Single Women and
Same-Sex Couples from Infertility Services and Its Role in Defining What Constitutes Justified
and Unjustified Limitations on Reproductive Freedom, 10 MINN. J.L. SCI. & TECH. 291, 308
(2009).
2 See Lucille M. Ponte & Jennifer L. Gillan, From Our Family to Yours: Rethinking the
"Beneficial Family" and Marriage-Centric Corporate Benefit Programs, 14 COLUM. J. GENDER
& L. 1, 1 (2005) (describing the stereotypical 1950s American family).
3 Linda C. McClain, Family Constitutions and the (New) Constitution of the Family, 75
FORDHAM L. REv. 833, 854 (2006).
4 Cf Ralph C. Brashier, Children and Inheritance in the Nontraditional Family, 1996
Utah L. Rev. 93, 104-05 (discussing the dramatic rise in nonmarital children since the 1960s).
5 Jamie Rowsell, Stayin' Alive: Postmortem Reproduction and Inheritance Rights, 41
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Therefore, individuals do not have to let a little thing like death
prevent them from conceiving children with the loves of their lives.
Posthumous reproduction permits families to create living memorials
to their dead love ones.6
A dead man's sperm can be used to impregnate a woman years
after his death, and a surrogate can use the eggs of a dead woman
to conceive a child.8 These are just a couple of the miracles made
possible by advancements in reproductive technology. Physicians and
other health care providers hail the beneficial uses of reproductive
technology and scientists marvel over the developments that make
such uses possible. Lawyers and others in the legal community,
however, are forced to deal with the mistakes that inevitably occur.9
Even when everything goes according to plan, families are sometimes
forced to deal with the often unforeseen legal consequences that arise
from using reproductive technology.
This Essay highlights some of the legal consequences resulting
from the widespread availability and use of reproductive technology.
The Essay is divided into three parts. Part I examines the steps that
must be taken to identify the legal parents of the posthumously
conceived children. Part II discusses the reproductive rights of the
deceased gamete providers. Since most posthumous reproduction is
done using the sperm of dead men, the discussion centers on male
reproductive rights. Finally, Part M focuses on the inheritance rights
of posthumously conceived children.
I. IDENTIFYING THE LEGAL PARENTS
A key consequence of the existence of children conceived
posthumously using reproductive technology is the law's need to
identify the parents of those children. Establishing the parent-child
relationship is crucial because it determines the child's status as
FAM. CT. REv. 400,400 (2003).
6 Evelyne Shuster, The Posthumous Gift of Life: The World According to Kane, 15 J.
CONTEMP. HEALTH L. & POL'Y 401, 409-10 (1999) ("It seems unfair from the child's
perspective to be conceived as a 'loving memorial' or a product of a gift-exchange.").
7 Janet J. Berry, Essay, Life After Death: Preservation of the Immortal Seed, 72 TUL. L.
REv. 231, 232 (1997) ("In today's brave new world, children can be conceived after the death of
their fathers through post-mortem artificial insemination.").
8 Kristin L. Antall, Note, Who Is My Mother?; Why States Should Ban Posthumous
Reproduction by Women, 9 HEALTH MATRIX 203, 210 (1999) (noting that one "theory behind
posthumous reproduction is to have a child after the genetic mother has died").
9 See Leslie Bender, "To Err Is Human" ART Mix-Ups: A Labor-Based, Relational
Proposal, 9 J. GENDER RACE & JusT. 443, 443-53 (2006) (recounting a multitude of cases in
which mistakes occurred during the assisted reproduction process).
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legitimate or illegitimate.'0 In an Ohio surrogacy case, for example,
because the surrogate was not married to the child's father, the child
would have been classified as illegitimate had the court recognized
the surrogate as the child's legal mother." Although courts and
legislatures have taken steps to remove the stigma of illegitimacy,12
non-marital children still face cultural, emotional, and legal barriers. 3
For instance, in order for a child to receive financial support, inherit
under the intestacy system, or collect Social Security and other
government benefits, the child must demonstrate the existence of a
legal parent-child relationship.14
Identifying the legal parents of children conceived using
reproductive technology is just one of the challenges the legal system
faces as use of this technology becomes more common. To illustrate
the problems that can arise from situations involving the use or
misuse of reproductive technology, I will rely in this Part on three
widely publicized cases, building on their actual facts to demonstrate
the breadth of legal issues that may emerge.
A. The Moms
When a child is conceived as the result of a surrogacy agreement,
there are often two women involved. Thus, it is possible that each will
vie for the legal title of "mother."15 There are two common types of
surrogacy arrangements-traditional and gestational. In a traditional
surrogacy arrangement, the surrogate supplies the ova to conceive the
child and carries the child in her uterus. Because the traditional
surrogate has supplied the genetic material used to create the child,
10 See Christopher A. Scharman, Note, Not Without My Father: The Legal Status of the
Posthumously Conceived Child, 55 VAND. L. REV. 1001, 1038 (2002) (arguing that the law
should recognize a child resulting from posthumous conception as the legal child of both genetic
parents, not just the living parent).
I See Belsito v. Clark, 644 N.E.2d 760,762 (Ohio Com. Pl. 1994).
12 See Richard F. Storrow, The Policy of Family Privacy: Uncovering the Bias in Favor of
Nuclear Families in American Constitutional Law and Policy Reform, 66 Mo. L. REV. 527, 594
& 594 nn.467-71 (2001) (highlighting legislative and judicial actions to "align the treatment
accorded nonmarital children with that accorded marital children").
"3 See Patricia J. Miller, Johnson v. Hunter: Protecting the Nonmarital Child's Interests
Despite the Minnesota Parentage Act's Shortcomings, 10 LAW & INEQ. 81, 88-89 (1991)
(evaluating the social stigma and legal consequences that arise when legislation distinguishes
between marital and nonmarital children).
14 See Bruce L. Wilder, Assisted Reproduction Technology: Trends and Suggestions
for the Developing law, 18 J. AM. ACAD. MATRIMONIAL L. 177, 199 (2002) (discussing
inheritance issues raised by children born through posthumous reproduction, including their
eligibility to receive Social Security benefits).
15 See Suzanne F. Seavello, Are You My Mother? A Judge's Decision in In Vitro
Fertilization Surrogacy, 3 HASTINGS WOMEN'S L.J. 211, 224-27 (1992) (evaluating the three
natural parents created through in vitro fertilization because of the existence of two mothers).
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she is the child's biological mother.16 Genetics alone, however, may
not be enough to establish the surrogate as the child's legal mother.17
In contrast, in a gestational surrogacy arrangement, the surrogate
carries a child using the genetic material of another woman. The
gestational surrogate is thus not biologically linked to the child to
whom she gives birth.' 8 Nevertheless, the lack of a biological
connection does not prevent the surrogate from being recognized as
the child's legal mother.19
Recently, the news headlines were awash with stories about
Carolyn Salvage, the Ohio woman who, while attempting to undergo
in vitro fertilization, was implanted with the wrong embryo. 20
Although Ms. Salvage graciously agreed to serve as a surrogate for
the woman who supplied the genetic material that was accidentally
implanted into her uterus, 21 the story could easily have ended with a
contentious battle for custody of the child.
The issue of the maternity of a child born using a surrogate has
22
not been completely resolved. Legislatures have provided little
guidance, leaving courts to deal with the issue on a case-by-case
basis. The end result is a common-law system that is confusing and
unhelpful.23
16 See Emily Stark, Comment, Born to No Mother: In Re Roberto D.B. and Equal
Protection for Gestational Surrogates Rebutting Maternity, 16 AM. U. J. GENDER SOC. POL'Y &
L. 283, 287 (2007).
17 See id. at 288-90 (comparing the "intent test" and the "genetics test" for determining
legal motherhood and explaining that neither test is followed universally).
18 See Jamie L. Zuckerman, Note, Extreme Makeover-Surrogacy Edition: Reassessing
the Marriage Requirement in Gestational Surrogacy Contracts and the Right to Revoke Consent
in Traditional Surrogacy Agreements, 32 NOVA L. REV. 661, 663-64 (2008) (discussing the
different types of gestational surrogacy arrangements); see also Bernard Friedland & Valerie
Epps, The Changing Family and the U.S. Immigration Laws: The Impact of Medical
Reproductive Technology on the Immigration and Nationality Act's Definition of the Family, 11
GEO. IMMIGR. L.J. 429, 452-58 (1997) (discussing the surrogate's possible parental status in
several different scenarios).
19 See, e.g., A.H.W. v. G.H.B., 772 A.2d 948 (N.J. Super. Ct. Ch. Div. 2000) (denying a
pre-birth order to establish the intended parents as the legal parents of the child carried by a
surrogate on the grounds that such an order would violate New Jersey adoption statutes as well
as the clear public policy of that state).
20 See, e.g., Carolyn Savage, Ohio Woman Implanted With Wrong Embryo, Gives Birth,
HUFFINGTON POST, Sept. 26, 2009, www.huffingtonpost.com/2009/09/26/carolyn-savage-ohio
-woman n 300710.htmil.
21 Id.
22 See Golnar Modjtahedi, Comment, Nobody's Child: Enforcing Surrogacy Contracts, 20
WHTrTIER L. REV. 243, 244-48 (1998) (explaining that because of the disdain for surrogacy
contracts under many states' laws, as well as the disagreements that can arise among the parties
to a surrogacy arrangement, the legal parenthood of children born of surrogacies is often
questionable).
23 See id. (explaining that most state legislatures that have addressed surrogacy by
statutory enactment have done so largely to make them illegal and even criminal, leaving courts
to determine custody issues on a case-by-case basis, and arguing that only full legal recognition
of surrogacy arrangements will give the children born some level of security regarding the
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For example, a surrogate who gives birth to a child in New Jersey
has the opportunity to be designated as the child's legal mother even
if she has no biological connection to the child. In A.H. W. v. G.H.B.24
a New Jersey court referred to the woman as a gestational mother
instead of a gestational surrogate,25 reasoning that a woman who
gestates and gives birth to a child should not be treated as though she
is merely an incubator.26 According to the court, the fact that the child
stays inside the surrogate for nine months creates a bond between the
woman and child that the law should not disregard.27
In California, on the other hand, even a surrogate who is the
child's biological mother may not be classified as the child's legal
mother if evidence indicates that the parties intended a different
outcome. In Johnson v. Calvert,28 the California Supreme Court held
that the appropriate test for determining the identity of the legal
mother of the child was the "intent" test. 29 Specifically, the court
stated, "she who intended to procreate the child-that is, she who
intended to bring about the birth of a child that she intended to raise
as her own-is the natural mother under California law."3 o
Other courts have advocated a variety of different tests to
adjudicate the legal mother of a child conceived as the consequence
of a surrogacy arrangement. For instance, in Belsito v. Clark, an Ohio
court held that genetics or blood, not intent, is the determining
factor. 3 1 After reviewing the limited case law from other jurisdictions,
the court concluded that in order for a person to be deemed a natural
parent, the person had to be genetically connected to the child,
as established by a DNA blood test.32 In contrast, the dissenting
justice in Johnson argued that the "best interests of the child" test was
identity of their parents).
24 772 A.2d 948, 954 (N.J. Super. Ct. Ch. Div. 2000).
2 See id.
26 See id. at 953.
27 See id.; cf. Lawrence 0. Gostin, Surrogacy from the Perspectives of Economic and Civil
Liberties, 17 J. CONTEMP. HEALTH L. & POL'Y 429, 429 (2001) (disagreeing with Judge
Posner's view that surrogacy contracts are merely economic transactions in which "[tihe parties
are in relatively free and equal bargaining positions, the arrangements are mutually beneficial,
and third parties (notably the children) are not harmed," and asserting instead that gestational
mothers should not be permitted to waive parental rights in a surrogacy agreement and that legal
motherhood should be determined based on the child's best interests).
28 851 P.2d 776 (Cal. 1993) (en banc).
29 See id. at 782.
30 Id.
31 See Belsito v. Clark, 644 N.E. 2d 760, 763 (Ohio Com. Pl. 1994). For an analysis of
Belsito, see Dawn Wenk, Note, Belsito v. Clark: Ohio's Battle With "Motherhood," 28 U. TOL.
L. REv. 247 (1996).
32 See Belsito, 644 N.E.2d at 767. According to the court, "[t]he test to identify the natural
parents should be, 'Who are the genetic parents?' Id. at 766.
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the appropriate standard to apply to determine maternity.3 3 Thus,
according to Justice Kennard, when adjudicating maternity, the court
should strive to protect the welfare of the child rather than merely
promote the intentions of the adults.M Finally, the Supreme Court
of Tennessee recently concluded that the proper standard for
adjudicating maternity is a multi-factor test that focuses on all of the
circumstances surrounding the particular case.35 The test is flexible
and varies depending on the facts of the case before the court. 36
Historically, it was easy to identify the legal mother of a child. The
woman who gave birth to the child was usually the one who supplied
the genetic material that was used to create the child.37 One of the
consequences of assigning those roles to two different women is the
increase in litigation. When a surrogate arrangement goes according
to plan, it is a beautiful thing. Nonetheless, if the surrogate decides
that she cannot bear to part with the child, the court is forced to step
in and assume the role of Solomon-perhaps without the appropriate
amount of wisdom.
Uncertainty regarding the parental rights of surrogates seriously
complicates the already complex issues associated with posthumous
reproduction. If a man hired a surrogate to carry a child created using
his dead wife's genetic material, he probably would not want the
gestational surrogate to be identified as the child's legal mother.
However, the courts may be reluctant to designate the child as legally
motherless.3 8 Since the woman who supplied the genetic material
used to conceive the child would be dead, she could not be named as
the child's legal mother. Thus, the man may be forced to have some
type of relationship with a woman who is virtually a stranger to him.
33 Johnson, 851 P.2d at 788.
3 Id. at 789.
35 See In re C.K.G., 173 S.W.3d 714, 726-30 (Tenn. 2005) (declining to adopt any
specific rule for determining maternity in surrogacy arrangements, but instead analyzing several
factors in light of the particular facts of the case, including: genetics, intent, gestation, and
whether there is a controversy between competing would-be mothers).
36 See id. at 727 (deeming it appropriate to decide the case on its particular facts); see also
id. at 730-31 (concluding that crafting a general rule regarding maternity in surrogacy is a job
best suited for the legislature and encouraging the Tennessee General Assembly to investigate
the issue and produce applicable legislation).
37 See David M. Buss, Evolution and Human Mating, 18 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 537,
543-44 (1995) (noting that, because of the fundamental reproductive differences between men
and women, "women are 100% certain that they are the mothers of their children, while men are
always less than 100% certain").
38 Noa Ben-Asher, The Curing Law: On The Evolution of Baby-Making Markets, 30
CARDOZO L. REv. 1885, 1921 (2009) (discussing dissenting opinions in gestational surrogacy
cases that "reveal judicial anxiety about the creation of motherless families through the use of
reproductive technologies").
[Vol. 60:41164
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Some jurisdictions provide a procedure for having gestational
surrogacy agreement preapproved.39 As a part of the process, the
gestational surrogate must agree to surrender the child to the intended
parent or parents.4 This is only a partial solution to the problem.
First, only a few states have statutes setting out a prior approval
process for gestational surrogacy agreements. Hence, very few
potential intended parents are protected by such statutory mandates.
Second, at least one court has held that the gestational surrogate
could not lawfully surrender the child until at least seventy-two hours
after the birth, removing even the possibility of preapproval in that
jurisdiction. 4 1 Third, the language and legislative histories of the
existing preapproval statutes indicate that they were meant to apply
to situations where all of the parties were alive. The possibility
of posthumous reproduction is not discussed. Finally, in most cases,
following the statutory mandates only creates a presumption that
the surrogacy agreement is enforceable. Since that presumption is
rebuttable, the man may still end up in a custody battle.
B. The Dads
In addition to creating complicated issues of maternity, the
availability of reproductive technology has also impacted the legal
determination of paternity. The oldest and most commonly used
42form of reproductive technology is artificial insemination. Artificial
insemination is simpler and more affordable than other types of
assisted reproduction.4 3 As a consequence, the majority of state
SWeldon E. Havins & James J. Dalessio, Reproductive Surrogacy at the Millennium:
Proposed Model Legislation Regulating "Non-Traditional" Gestational Surrogacy Contracts,
31 McGEORGE L. REV. 673, 686 (2000) (noting that New Hampshire and Virginia actually
require judicial preapproval of surrogacy agreements in order to render them enforceable).
4 See, e.g., FLA. STAT. ANN. § 742.15(3)(c) (West 2007); ILL. COMP STAT. ANN.
47/25(c)(1)(ii) (West 2009).
41 A.H.W. v. G.H.B., 772 A.2d 948, 954 (N.J. Super. Ct. Ch. Div. 2000). The court
indicated that subjecting the surrogate to a binding pre-birth agreement to relinquish parental
rights was contrary to state law because the surrogate had a right to change her mind after the
child's birth. Id.
42 See Elizabeth A. Bryant, Comment, In the Interest of R.C., Minor Child: The Colorado
Artificial Insemination by Donor Statute and the Non-Traditional Family, 67 DENV. U. L. REV.
79, 79 (1990) ("Artificial insemination is modem reproductive technology's oldest and most
common technique." (footnotes omitted)).
43 See Barbara K. Padgett, Note, Illegitimate Children Conceived by Artificial
Insemination: Does Some State Legislation Deny Them Equal Protection Under the Fourteenth
Amendment?, 32 U. LOUISVILLE J. FAM. L. 511, 518 (1993-94); see also Justyn Lezin,
(Mis)Conceptions: Unjust Limitations on Legally Unmarried Women's Access to Reproductive
Technology and Their Use of Known Donors, 14 HASTINGS WOMEN's L.J. 185, 190-93 (2003)
(discussing different types of assisted reproductive technology).
In vitro fertilization is more expensive and not as effective. Nonetheless, some people
successfully use it to achieve pregnancy. See Keith Alan Byers, Infertility and In Vitro
2010] 1165
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legislatures have sought to regulate that technology." Married
couples use artificial insemination when the husband has a low
sperm count or when his sperm are insufficiently motile.4 5 Artificial
insemination using a woman's husband's sperm is not controversial;
in those cases, the resulting children are treated as if they were
conceived through sexual intercourse.4 6 However, difficult legal
questions may arise when a man's wife is artificially inseminated
using donor sperm. A wife may use donor sperm if her husband
suffers from male infertility, which amounts to an inability to produce
quality sperm, or if her husband has a genetic disease that would
impact the baby's health.4 7
As an example, California couple Katie and Robert Aschero
decided to use reproductive technology to start a family. They
submitted their genetic material to a San Francisco fertility clinic
where the clinic staff was supposed to create embryos by fertilizing
Katie's ova with Robert's sperm.4 8 The clinic created thirteen
embryos using Katie's ova,49 but seven of those embryos were
accidentally created using the sperm of a stranger.50 Instead of
notifying the Ascheros about the mistake, the clinic staff disposed of
the seven embryos that were created using the stranger's sperm, and
implanted only the embryos made using Robert's sperm.
The situation would have been different, however, if the
mistakenly fertilized embryos had been implanted into Katie's uterus.
She would have given birth to a child using donor sperm, which may
have raised issues about the child's paternity. Legislatures in a
majority of states have enacted statutes designating the paternity of
Fertilization: A Growing Need for Consumer-Oriented Regulation of the In Vitro Fertilization
Industry, 18 J. LEGAL MED. 265, 285 (1997) (noting that in vitro fertilization was involved with
26,000 births in the United States in 1994).
4 See, e.g., IDAHO CODE ANN. § 39-5403 (2002) (providing an example of a state
requirement for consent to paternity arising from artificial insemination).
5 See Milena D. O'Hara & Andrew W. Vorzimer, In re Marriage of Buzzanca: Charting
a New Destiny, 26 W. ST. U. L. REv. 25, 33 (1999) ("For couples experiencing infertility due to
poor sperm count, motility or morphology, artificial insemination is often indicated, whether by
use of the husband's sperm or donor sperm.").
6 See Padgett, supra note 43, at 517 (noting that few legal issues arise when the donor
and mother are spouses).
4 Kathryn Venturatos Lorio, Alternative Means of Reproduction: Virgin Territory for
Legislation, 44 LA. L. REV. 1641, 1643-44 (1984); Helene S. Shapo, Matters of Ife and Death:
Inheritance Consequences of Reproductive Technologies, 25 HOFSTRA L. REV. 1091, 1107
(1997).
48 See Steven Ertelt, Fertility Clinics in California, Louisiana Face Lawsuits over
Destroying Embryos, LiFE NEWS, Sept. 29, 2009, http://www.1ifenews.com/bio2974.html.
49 Id.
5o Id.
5I Id. The IVF treatment that Katie Aschero underwent was ultimately unsuccessful. Id.
1166 [Vol. 60:4
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children conceived as the result of artificial insemination.52 Under
most of these statutes, a man is not legally responsible for a child
his wife conceives using donor sperm unless he gives his consent
prior to the insemination. If the rules provided in those statutes were
applicable to in vitro situations, 4 Katie Aschero's child would have
been legally fatherless. Since he did not consent to the artificial
insemination of his wife with donor sperm, Robert Aschero would not
have been the child's legal father. Indeed, Robert intended for Katie
to become pregnant using his sperm, not the sperm of another man.
Further, the stranger sperm donor would probably not have been
recognized as the child's legal father. In the majority of jurisdictions,
the sperm donor is never the legal father of the child.55 He is either
not recognized as having parental rights or is required to waive his
parental rights at the time he donates his sperm.
The Nadya Suleman case similarly demonstrates some of the
difficult issues raised by the use of reproductive technology. It
also highlights some of the consequences of allowing doctors to use
reproductive technology to produce children without any effective
regulation. In Suleman's case, a fertility doctor implanted eight
embryos into the uterus of a single woman who already had six
children under the age of seven.57 The public's initial reaction to
Suleman's historic situation was positive. Nonetheless, when the
circumstances of Suleman's life came to light, public support turned
52 See Sharon L. Tiller, Note, Litigation, Legislation, and Limelight: Obstacles to
Commercial Surrogate Mother Arrangements, 72 IOWA L. REv. 415,431-32 (1987) (discussing
many states' adoption of artificial insemination statutes modeled after the Uniform Parentage
Act).
5 See, e.g., IDAHO CODE ANN. § 39-5405(3) (2002) (providing that "[tihe relationship,
rights and obligation" between the child and the artificially inseminated mother are the same as
they would be if the mother were naturally impregnated only if "the husband consented to the
performance of the artificial insemination"); 750 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 40/3(a) (West 2009)
(providing that for a child produced by artificial insemination of a married woman, the husband
will be treated as the natural father of the child if the wife is inseminated "with the consent of
[the] husband").
5 At least one court has held, however, that sperm donor statutes are not applicable to
IVF. See In re Parentage of J.M.K, 119 P.3d 840, 849 (Wash. 2005) (en banc).
5 See, e.g., IDAHO CODE ANN. § 39-5405(1) ("The donor shall have no right, obligation
or interest with respect to a child born as a result of the artificial insemination.").
5 See Browne Lewis, Two Fathers, One Dad: Allocating the Paternal Obligations
Between the Men Involved in the Artificial Insemination Process, 13 LEWIS & CLARK L. REV.
949, 973 (2009) [hereinafter Lewis, Two Fathers] ("In most jurisdictions, sperm donors are not
given parental status.").
5 See Tia M. Young, Comment, Removing the Veil, Uncovering the Truth: A Child's
Right to Compel Disclosure of His Biological Father's Identity, 53 How. L.J. 217, 231 (2009).
5 See Naomi R. Cahn & Jennifer M. Collins, Eight Is Enough, 103 Nw. U. L. REV.
COLLOQUY 501, 501 (2009), http://www.law.northwestem.edu/lawreview/colloquy/2009/22/LR
Coll2009n22Cahn&Collins.pdf.
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to outrage.59 Suleman was unmarried, unemployed, and on public
assistance.w Eventually, Suleman may be able to obtain financial
support for both her children and herself. Suleman's fourteen children
are themselves financial resources in light of television shows like
Jon & Kate Plus Eight1 and 19 Kids & Counting.62 These programs
indicate that television networks are willing to pay a premium to
parents of children who are conceived under unusual circumstances.
Nevertheless, the Suleman case is a recipe for disaster. For one, the
genetic father of Suleman's fourteen children may be motivated to
claim paternal rights on account of the possibility of pecuniary gain to
be derived from the babies. Artificial insemination statutes in the
majority of jurisdictions make it clear that sperm donors are never
recognized as the fathers of the children conceived using their
sperm.6 3 However, those statutes may not be applicable to the
Suleman case. First, most of the statutes only apply to married
couples." Second, at least one court has stated that an artificial
insemination statute does not apply to situations involving in vitro
fertilization. Finally, a Pennsylvania court recently recognized a
known sperm donor as the father of a child conceived using his
sperm.66 The Court focused on the fact that the woman knew the
sperm donor and that he had developed a relationship with the
children.67 Consequently, if California courts adopt similar reasoning
and the known sperm donor is ultimately granted parental rights,
these fourteen small children could be caught up in a nasty custody
battle. In order to avoid these types of situations, courts should
5 See id.
6 Id.
61 Jon and Kate was a reality show that aired on the TLC network. It focused on the life
of a couple raising eight children. See Jon & Kate Plus 8, http://tlc.discovery.com/tv/jon-and
-kate/jon-and-kate.html (last visited Sept. 28, 2010).
62 19 Kids & Counting is also a reality show on the TLC network. It focuses on the life of
a family consisting of a husband and a wife and nineteen children. The couple plans to continue
to have children. See 19 Kids & Counting, http://tlc.discovery.com/tv/duggars/ (last visited
Sept. 28, 2010).
63 See, e.g., ALA. CODE §26-17-702 (2009) ("A donor who donates to a licensed physician
for use by a married woman is not a parent of a child conceived by means of assisted
reproduction."); CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 45a-775 (West 2009) ("A donor of sperm used in
A.I.D., or any person claiming by or through him, shall not have any right or interest in any
child born as a result of A.ID.").
6 See Kira Horstmeyer, Note, Putting Your Eggs in Someone Else's Basket: Inserting
Uniformity into the Uniform Parentage Act's Treatment of Assisted Reproduction, 64 WASH. &
LEE L. REv. 671, 688-90 (2007) (discussing artificial insemination statutes that only deal with
artificial insemination occurring inside the context of marriage).
65 See In re Parentage of J.M.K., 119 P.3d 840, 849 (Wash. 2005) (en banc).
6 See Jacob v. Shultz-Jacob, 923 A.2d 473, 480 (Pa. Super. Ct. 2007).
67 Id. at 480-81 (discussing at some length the sperm donor's contact with and prior
financial support of the children in question).
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allocate paternity based upon the best interests of the artificially
conceived children.
II. PROTECTING THE REPRODUCTIVE RIGHTS OF DEAD MEN
The ability to conceive children using the genetic material of
dead people presents unique problems for the legal system.
Legislatures and courts have yet to fully deal with the consequences
of posthumous conception. In a minority of jurisdictions,
legislatures have passed statutes addressing children who have been
posthumously conceived.6 8 Courts, for their art, have decided a few
cases addressing the rights of these children. I consider the issues in
these cases to be post-conception issues.
This Part explores pre-conception issues, specifically examining
whether permitting posthumous conception interferes with the
reproductive rights of the deceased gamete provider. The discussion
is limited to the reproductive rights of dead men, and is divided into
two sub-parts. The first examines the reproductive rights of a dead
man who has taken steps to preserve his sperm in anticipation of
death. The second subpart focuses on the reproductive rights of a
man whose sperm is extracted after his death. In both types of cases,
doctors have to decide if a man's sperm should be used to produce a
child, and under some circumstances, doctors may be faced with the
difficult task of deciding who has the legal right to possess the dead
man's sperm.
A. The Man Stores His Sperm
There are numerous reasons why a man would choose to preserve
his sperm for later use. Historically, prior to going to war, men stored
their sperm to use it when they returned from combat,70 and that trend
has continued.7' Fertility clinics have reported that soldiers heading to
68 See Browne C. Lewis, Dead Men Reproducing: Responding to the Existence of
Afterdeath Children, 16 GEO. MASON L. REV. 403, 409 (2009) [hereinafter Lewis, Afterdeath
Children] ("[O]nly eleven states have statutes directly addressing [the inheritance rights of
posthumously conceived children].").
69 Barry Dunn, Note, Created After Death: Kentucky Law and Posthumously Conceived
Children, 48 U. LouisviLLE L. REv. 167, 177-80 (2009) (discussing cases involving claims for
social security benefits brought by posthumously conceived children).
70 See John A. Gibbons, Comment, Who's Your Daddy?: A Constitutional Analysis of
Post-Mortem Insemination, 14 J. CONTEMP. HEALTH L. & POL'Y 187, 190 (1997) ("[S]oldiers
participating in the Vietnam War stored sperm to ensure their ability to become fathers.").
71 See Sheri Gilbert, Note, Fatherhood from the Grave: An Analysis of Postmortem
Insemination, 22 HOFSTRA L. REV. 521, 525-26 (1993) (discussing the growing practice of
storing sperm at sperm banks, including soldiers cryogenically freezing their sperm before
deploying to the Persian Gulf during Operation Desert Storm).
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Iraq and Afghanistan are banking their sperm.72 Soldiers may choose
to store their sperm before going to war for several reasons. A wife or
significant other may encourage a man to store the sperm so in the
event that he does not return from his deployment, she will be able to
use his sperm to conceive a child.73 Under these circumstances, the
man will probably agree, often because of a desire to have a child to
carry on his bloodline.74 Even men who are single and not involved in
serious relationships are banking their sperm for later use, some out
of fear that they may become infertile as a consequence of toxins and
other hazards of war.75
Soldiers are not the only men who take steps to preserve their
sperm. Some men facing terminal illnesses like cancer store their
sperm before undergoing treatments that may leave them sterile.7 6 In
addition, recent medical research has indicated that the quality of a
man's sperm may deteriorate with age.77 Thus, more men may choose
to store their sperm when they are young for use when they decide to
become fathers later in life.
If a man dies after he stores his sperm, his doctors must decide
whether to release the sperm to the man's wife, significant other, or
next of kin. The physician's decision is easier if the man has left
instructions. Even if a man does not leave instructions, the fact that he
banked his sperm may be enough to indicate that he wanted to
procreate posthumously. Therefore, the public is not overly concerned
when his wife or significant other uses his sperm to conceive his
child.
72 Major Maria Doucettperry, To Be Continued: A Look at Posthumous Reproduction as It
Relates to Today's Military, ARMY LAw., May 2008, at 1, 2 n.7 (citing Valerie Alvord, Some
Troops Freeze Sperm Before Deploying, USA TODAY, Jan. 27, 2003, at lA).
7" See Charles P. Kindregan, Jr., Dead Dads: Thawing an Heir from the Freezer, 35 WM.
MITcHELL L. Rav. 433, 436 (2009).
74 Cf Michael H. Shapiro, Illicit Reasons and Means for Reproduction: On Excessive
Choice and Categorical and Technological Imperatives, 47 HASTINGS L.J. 1081, 1128 (1996)
(discussing potential reasons why a deceased might want to posthumously reproduce).
75 See Michelle L. Brenwald & Kay Redeker, Note, A Primer on Posthumous Conception
and Related Issues of Assisted Reproduction, 38 WASHBURN L.J. 599, 603 (1999) (indicating
that sperm banking possibly benefitted soldiers in Desert Storm who wanted to father healthy
children despite exposure to toxic chemicals during the conflict).
76 See, e.g., Woodward v. Comm'r of Soc. Sec., 760 N.E.2d 257, 260 (Mass. 2002)
(noting that the plaintiff and her husband arranged for preservation of the husband's semen
before he underwent treatment for leukemia), cited in Margaret Ward Scott, Comment, A Look
at the Rights and Entitlements of Posthumously Conceived Children: No Surefire Way to Tame
the Reproductive Wild West, 52 EMORY L.J. 963, 985 (2003).
7 See Kimberly Horvath, Does Bragdon v. Abbott Provide the Missing Link for Infertile
Couples Seeking Protection Under the ADA?, 2 DEPAUL J. HEALTH CARE L. 819, 821 (1999)
("Age is ... a factor in male infertility because the number of motile sperm reduces with age.").
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1. The Man Leaves Instructions
In cases where the man has left instructions regarding the
distribution of his sperm, fertility clinics and courts have tended to
respect his wishes.78 Yet cases still arise because someone challenges
the proposed treatment of the dead man's sperm.79 The issue in these
cases is whether to release the man's sperm for use in posthumous
reproduction or dispose of it. This in turn raises the issue of whether a
man's sperm belongs to him; if it does, he should be permitted to
control the its use. Some commentators argue that a man cannot own
his sperm because they are uncomfortable with sperm being classified
as property.so Others claim that sperm should be treated like organs.
If a man leaves instructions, those should be honored.82 If he does not,
his next of kin should be allowed to decide what should be done with
the sperm. Still other commentators opine that the man's property
interest in his sperm is extinguished at death, so his widow should be
authorized to make decisions regarding his sperm.83
The main goal of the probate system is to carry out the wishes of
the decedent with regard to his property. Thus, courts tend to honor a
dead person's written request. As long as the decedent has the legal
right to dispose of the property, the probate court will carry out his or
her intentions." The California case of Hecht v. Superior Court 5 is
78 See, e.g., Hecht v. Superior Court, 20 Cal. Rptr. 2d. 275, 276 (Ct. App. 1993)
(analyzing a letter the decedent sent to a sperm bank authorizing it to release his sperm to his
girlfriend in order to effectuate the decedent's intent regarding the use of his stored sperm).
7 See, e.g., In re Estate of Kievernagel, 83 Cal. Rptr. 3d. 311 (Ct. App. 2008).
8 See, e.g., Monica Shah, Modem Reproductive Technologies: Legal Issues Concerning
Cryopreservation and Posthumous Conception, 17 J. LEGAL MED. 547, 558 (1996) (identifying
three major arguments in opposition to the conception of sperm as property). Shah observes:
The first argument.. . is that the sale of sperm, ova, and preembryos would
encourage "the perception of body parts as interchangeable commodities and
undermines the recognition of the human body as the physical embodiment of the
personality." The second argument . .. is that, especially in the case of ova and
preembryos, such sales could lead to the exploitation of the poor for the benefit of
the rich.... [The third argument is that] requiring such donations to be "gifts" rather
than "sales" reaffirms social values.
Id. (footnote omitted).
91 See, e.g., Andrea Corvalan, Comment, Fatherhood After Death: A Legal and Ethical
Analysis of Posthumous Reproduction, 7 ALB. L.J. Sci. & TECH. 335, 364 (1997) (likening a
man's instnmctions regarding posthumous sperm use to an organ donor card).
82 See Susan Kerr, Post-Mortem Sperm Procurement: Is It Legal?, 3 DEPAUL J. HEALTH
CARE L. 39, 66-67 (1999) (comparing organ procurement with post-mortem sperm
procurement).
83 See Gilbert, supra note 71, at 549-50 ("When the sperm depositor is dead, the sperm's
unique characteristic, its potential for human life . . . should sometimes override the decedent's
property interest in the sperm.").
84 See Melissa B. Vegter, Note, The "Art" of Inheritance: A Proposal for Legislation
Requiring Proof of Parental Intent Before Posthumously Conceived Children Can Inherit from
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one example of a court exercising such respect for the wishes of a
dead man. William Kane stored fifteen vials of his sperm in a
California sperm bank and later gave the sperm bank a letter
authorizing the release of the sperm to his girlfriend, Ellen Hecht.86
Afterward, Kane executed a will leaving his sperm to Hecht. In his
will, Kane made it clear that he wanted Hecht to use his sperm to
conceive children and went so far as to mention his potential
posthumously conceived children in a letter that he left to his existing
children. Kane then committed suicide and Hecht sought custody
of the sperm. Although Kane's existing children objected, the court
issued an order preventing the sperm bank from destroying the
sperm.89 As a part of a settlement agreement, Hecht received three
vials of Kane's sperm.90
On the other hand, in Estate of Kievernagel,91 another California
court declined to overrule a sperm bank that refused to release the
dead man's sperm to his widow. Joseph and Iris Kievernagel had
been married for ten years, but could not have children.92 The couple
sought reproductive help from the Northern California Fertility
Medical Center. Their hope was for Iris to become pregnant through
in vitro fertilization using Joseph's sperm. The Center froze a sample
of Joseph's sperm to be used if the insemination with the live sperm
did not result in a pregnancy. 9 3 Before conducting the procedure, the
Center had Joseph sign a consent form. On the form, Joseph indicated
that, when he died, he wanted the Center to dispose of the frozen
sperm instead of releasing it to Iris.9 4 After Joseph was killed in a
helicopter crash, Iris petitioned the probate court, seeking an order
forcing the Center to give her Joseph's sperm. Eventually, the
California Court of Appeals ruled that Iris could not use Joseph's
sperm to conceive his child, reasoning that the seemingly harsh result
a Deceased Parent's Estate, 38 VAL. U. L. REv. 267, 299 (2003) ("The primary policy behind
intestacy statutes is to carry out the probable intent of the decedent. Therefore, when an
individual shows significant intent of parenting a child posthumously, the state has an interest in
carrying out this wish as well." (footnote omitted)).
85 20 Cal. Rptr. 2d. 275 (Ct. App. 1993).
8 Id. at 276.
87 Id.
8 Id.
89 Id. at 291.
9 Id.
91 83 Cal. Rptr. 3d. 311 (Ct. App. 2008).
9 Id. at 312.
9 See id.
9 See id.
9 See id.
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was merited because the Center had to respect Joseph's wishes and
destroy his sperm.96
2. The Man Does Not Leave Instructions
In cases where a man does not leave instructions regarding the use
of his sperm after his death, doctors usually honor the request of his
wife or significant other. Thus, if no one objects, the doctors will
generally release the sperm so the woman can use it to become
pregnant. However, this was not always the case, particularly when
the idea of posthumous conception was relatively new. In an early
French case, for example, a widow had to fight to get the right to
obtain possession of her dead husband's sperm. 97 Frenchman Alain
Parpalaix was diagnosed with testicular cancer. The recommended
treatment was chemotherapy, a treatment that carried the possibility
of a devastating side effect: the inability to have children.99 Thus,
before he started treatment, Alain had his sperm extracted and placed
in a sperm bank run by the government.1" Alain did not sign any
paperwork indicating what he wanted to happen to his sperm if he
died.' 0' Despite treatment, Alain's health did not improve. Two
days before he succumbed to cancer, Alain married his girlfriend,
Corinne.102 Corinne wanted to become pregnant using Alain's sperm
and asked the sperm bank to give her Alain's sperm.103 The sperm
bank refused Corinne's request because Alain had not consented to
have his sperm used after he died.'1' Corinne, however, successfully
sought relief from the court, and ultimately gained access to her dead
husband's sperm. 05 The outcome of this case indicates that, even if a
man does not leave written instructions, his wife may have the
opportunity to use his sperm to procreate. The court may have been
persuaded by the Alain's desire to have children. Although he did not
verbally express his wish to procreate, the court could have implied
96 See id. at 317.
9 See Parpalaix c. CECOS, Tribunal de grande instance [T.G.I.] [ordinary court of
original jurisdiction] Creteil, Aug. 1, 1984, Gaz. Pal. [1984], 2, pan. jurisp., 560; see also E.
Donald Shapiro & Benedene Sonnenblick, The Widow and the Sperm: The Law of Post-Mortem
Insemination, 1 J.L. & HEALTH 229, 229-33 (1986) (discussing Parpalaix, which was the first
case in France to deal with the issue of post-mortem insemination in 1984).
9s Shapiro & Sonnenblick, supra note 97, at 229.
9 Id.
iId.
' Id. at 229-30.
102 Id. at 230.
103 See id.
I0 See id.
05 See id. at 233. Unfortunately for Corinne, her subsequent attempts at artificial
insemination proved unsuccessful and she never carried Alain's child. See id.
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that fact from his actions. If Alain was not concerned about the
impact chemotherapy would have on his fertility, he did not have any
reasons to bank his sperm prior to starting treatment.
Currently, courts still conduct a case-by-case evaluation when
deciding whether to honor a woman's request for her dead husband's
sperm. As a part of that analysis, the court looks at all of the
surrounding circumstances, including the actions the dead man took
to preserve his fertility.
B. The Man Does Not Store His Sperm
The focus of many reproductive freedom debates is the protection
of the right to procreate. The United States Supreme Court has
recognized that a person has a fundamental right to procreate.'" Some
courts have used this proclamation to conclude that a person has a
corresponding right to not procreate.o 7 That right may be violated if
physicians are permitted to extract sperm from dead men, so that the
sperm can be used to conceive a child. Such extraction is especially
problematic when the man has not indicated that he wanted a child
created using his genetic material after his death. Under these
circumstances, there is no gatekeeper. The physician alone must make
the decision whether to extract the sperm, and it must be made
quickly because sperm is only viable for about thirty-six hours after a
man dies. 08 Physicians may be persuaded by the emotional stories of
those left behind, and ultimately, most of them grant such requests if
no one objects.109
106See, e.g., Skinner v. Oklahoma, 316 U.S. 535, 541 (1942) ("Marriage and procreation
are fundamental to the very existence and survival of [humans]."); see also Jennifer P. Brown,
Comment, "Unwanted, Anonymous, Biological Descendants": Mandatory Donation Laws and
Laws Prohibiting Preembryo Discard Violate the Constitutional Right to Privacy, 28 U.S.F. L.
REV. 183, 229-34 (1993) (discussing Skinner and other Supreme Court reproductive rights
jurisprudence identifying procreation as a fundamental right).
107See Jennifer L. Carow, Note, Davis v. Davis: An Inconsistent Exception to an
Otherwise Sound Rule Advancing Procreational Freedom and Reproductive Technology, 43
DEPAUL L. REV. 523, 553-54 (1994) (discussing Davis v. Davis and observing that the
Tennessee Supreme Court "found that in Tennessee the right of procreation was 'composed of
two rights of equal significance-the right to procreate and the right to avoid procreation."'
(quoting Davis v. Davis, 842 S.W.2d 588, 601 (Tenn. 1992))).
10 Mary F. Radford, Post-Mortem Sperm Retrieval and the Social Security
Administration: How Modern Reproductive Technology Makes Strange Bedfellows, 2 EST.
PLAN. & COMMUNrrY PROP. L.J. 33, 35-36 (2009).
0 See Ronald Chester, Double Trouble: Legal Solutions to the Medical Problems of
Unconsented Sperm Harvesting and Drug-Induced Multiple Pregnancies, 44 ST. LOUIS U. L.J.
451, 456 (2000) (discussing doctors' ability to make ad-hoc decisions regarding posthumous
sperm harvesting and the impact of such decisions on the medical profession's ability to
self-regulate).
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1. To Extract or Not to Extract
Reproductive technology that permits a man to procreate
posthumously has been hailed as a medical breakthrough. 0 That
technology gives the man the opportunity to carry on his bloodline
after he dies-an opportunity that is especially important for men
who are members of small families. Many men probably would not
object to the procedure because it is not invasive.'1 ' Further,
supporters of the sperm extraction may contend that a wife or
significant other should be permitted to have the child of the dead
man in order to help her through the grieving process.112
Those opposing the extraction of sperm from dead men claim the
procedure may force fatherhood upon a man without his permission.
This forced fatherhood, they contend, violates the man's right not to
procreate. " Opponents also argue that it is against public policy to
intentionally create fatherless children."' This is a big concern
because, if the woman dies in childbirth, the child would be an
orphan. Some cynics also question the motives. For instance, if Anna
Nicole Smith' 5 had conceived a child from her dead husband's
sperm, that child may have received a substantial part of his
billion-dollar estate. Others are troubled by the fact that most people
seeking to use the sperm of dead men to create children have modest
means116 and may end up applying for Social Security and other
government benefits to support the posthumously conceived child."'
n
0 See Gibbons, supra note 70, at 190 (describing the discovery that sperm could be
cryogenically frozen and used later for reproduction as a "medical breakthrough").
'" See Cornell University Department of Urology, Male Infertility-Surgical Sperm
Retrieval, http://www.cornellurology.com/infertility/srt/ssr.shtml (last visited Aug. 15, 2010)
(describing the process of retrieving sperm from a man's body).
112 Laurence C. Nolan, Posthumous Conception: A Private or Public Matter?, 11 B.Y.U. J.
PUB. L. 1, 23 (1997) ("For the donee, to have a child who is genetically-related to the donor may
ease the grieving process and aid in the donee's adjustment to life without the donor.").
" See, e.g., Michael K. Elliott, Tales of Parenthood from the Crypt: The Predicament of
the Posthumously Conceived Child, 39 REAL PROP. PROB. & TR. J. 47, 63-64 (2004) (discussing
the judiciary's recognition of a decedent's right of reproductive choice in the face of "forced
procreation" after death).
114 See, e.g., Shuster, supra note 6, at 409-10.
1s For a discussion of the Anna Nicole Smith inheritance case, see Diane J. Klein, The
Disappointed Heir's Revenge, Southern Style: Tortious Interference with Expectation of
Inheritance-A Survey with Analysis of State Approaches in the Fifth and Eleventh Circuits, 55
BAYLOR L. REv. 79, 102-04 (2003).
"
6 See John Doroghazi, Note, Gillette-Netting v. Barnhart and Unanswered Questions
About Social Security Benefits for Posthumously Conceived Children, 83 WASH. U. L.Q. 1597,
1618 (2005) (noting that Social Security is not supposed to be a general welfare program).
117 See id. at 1619 (proposing a plan to discourage women from conceiving a decedent's
child purely for the Social Security Benefits by preventing such women from receiving
benefits); see also Kristine S. Knaplund, Equal Protection, Postmortem Conception, and
Intestacy, 53 U. KAN. L. REV. 627, 631-33 (2005) (discussing a potential mother's financial
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2. To Release or Not to Release
Because the extraction of sperm from dead men is not heavily
regulated, physicians are forced to be the decision-makers. After
making the difficult decision regarding the removal of the dead man's
sperm, they must decide whether to honor requests for the extracted
sperm. Traditionally, the person seeking to obtain the dead man's
sperm was his wife or significant other, and this still constitutes
the majority of requests for the release of dead men's sperm.
Nonetheless, other family members have recently started going to
court to get permission to take possession of postmortem sperm."
The easy cases are those involving wives and blood relations. In
deciding whether to order the physician to release the sperm, the
courts generally seek to predict what the dead man would have
wanted. The purpose of intestacy is to carry out the testator's
presumed intent with regard to the disposition of his property."9
Because at least one court has recognized sperm as property that can
be disposed of by will,120 this same logic may be applied to
distribution of the dead man's sperm. Under the intestacy system, the
surviving spouse is awarded a portion of the decedent's estatel 2 1
based on the assumption that the decedent would want his or her
spouse to receive a part of the estate.12 2 Courts may rely on similar
assumptions to conclude the decedent would want his widow to be
able to use his sperm to conceive his child.
Cases involving surviving spouses' access to postmortem sperm
are becoming increasingly common.123 The increased number of these
requests has caused the courts to get involved. For example, on March
31, 2008, Dayne Darren Dhanoolal lost his life in Baghdad after he
incentives for using a decedent's sperm).
"
8 See Katheryn D. Katz, Parenthood from the Grave: Protocols for Retrieving and
Utilizing Gametes from the Dead or Dying, 2006 U. CI. LEGAL F. 289, 295 (noting that
"requests for [sperm retrieval] have been increasingly frequent and are expected to grow").
"
9 See Ronald J. Scalise, Jr., Honor Thy Father and Mother?: How Intestacy Law Goes
Too Far in Protecting Parents, 37 SETON HALL L. REv. 171, 173-74 (2006) (discussing the
"presumed-will" theory).
120 See Hecht v. Superior Court, 20 Cal. Rptr. 2d. 275, 275 (Ct. App. 1993).
121 See Laura A. Rosenbury, Two Ways to End a Marriage: Divorce or Death, 2005 UTAH
L. REV. 1227, 1261-62 (discussing the spousal share in the disposition of a decedent's estate in
intestacy).
'
22 See Mark Glover, Formal Execution and Informal Revocation: Manfestations of
Probate's Family Protection Policy, 34 OKLA. CITY U. L. REv. 411, 416-17 (2009) (discussing
the theories underlying the spousal elective share).
12 3 See Kristine S. Knaplund, Postmortem Conception and a Father's Last Will, 46 ARIZ.
L. REv. 91, 93-94 (2004) (discussing the increasing practice of "harvesting" sperm from a
deceased male).
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was killed in an explosion. 12 4 Kynesha, Dayne's young wife, was
determined to ensure that his legacy would not end in the war. Prior
to his death, Dayne had made it clear that he wanted to father
children, and the couple had thought they had plenty of time to do
it.12 5 Upon learning of Dayne's death, Kynesha went to court for a
restraining order to have his sperm removed before the army could
have him embalmed.12 6
Spouses are not the only ones seeking access to sperm for
posthumous reproduction purposes. According to the intestacy system
in most states, if a man dies without a surviving spouse or children,
his estate goes to his parents. 127 In such a case, his parents would have
the legal right to make all decisions pertaining to the disposal of his
body and his property. Some parents have exercised that right by
having the man's sperm removed posthumously.
Marissa Evans, a Texan, loved her son, Nikolas. She probably
looked forward to the day when Nikolas would give her
grandchildren to spoil. Marissa's hopes were shattered when Nikolas
was killed in a bar fight.12 8 Although he was only twenty-three,
Marissa told a Texas court that Nikolas had always wanted three
children. Nikolas's desire for children was allegedly so strong that he
had already picked out their names.129 At the time of his death, it did
not appear that Nikolas was involved in a relationship. However,
Marissa did not let that fact ruin her plans. Instead, she went to court
to get permission to have Nikolas's sperm extracted and released to
her, and the court granted her request.13 0
When the situation does not involve a wife or parent, however,
physicians have to be cautious. Requests by girlfriends may be
problematic for several reasons. First, there may be situations where
the man has an active dating life. It would be difficult for the
physician to decide to whom to release the sperm, and it is likely
124 See Plaintiffs Memorandum of Law in Support of Her Emergency Motion for a
Temporary Restraining Order at 1, Dhanoolal v. U.S. Dep't of the Army, No. 4:08-CV-42(CDL)
(M.D. Ga. Apr. 4,2008).
125 See id. (noting that Dayne and Kynesha had spoken of having children on numerous
occasions).
12 6 Id. at 2; see also Kimberly E. Naguit, Note, The Inadequacies of Missouri Intestacy
Law: Addressing the Rights of Posthumously Conceived Children, 74 MO. L. REV. 889, 889
(2009).
'" See Kymberleigh N. Korpus, Note, Extinguishing Inheritance Rights: California Breaks
New Ground in the Fight Against Elder Abuse but Fails to Build an Effective Foundation, 52
HASTINGS L.J. 537, 559 (2001) (observing that the default disposition is to the decedent's
parents if he or she dies without a spouse or children).
12 8 See Judge Oks Collection of Dead Man's Sperm, CBS NEWS, April 8, 2009,
http://www.cbsnews.com/stories/2009/04/08/national/main4928335.shtml?tag=mncol;1st; 1.
129 Id.
130See id.
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unwise to release it on a first-come, first-served basis. Moreover,
neither physicians nor courts want the task of determining with which
woman the man would want to conceive his child, and it would be
against public policy to release the sperm to multiple women. Second,
it may be difficult to verify the existence of a relationship where
the couple was not legally married. The decision to release the
sperm typically has to be made quickly, so there may not be time to
determine the veracity of the woman's claim. Third, people usually
assume that a man wants to procreate with his wife. The law
presumes that a man is the father of children born to his wife
during their marriage. 13 1 No such presumption exists in non-marital
situations.
The story of Johnny Quintana and Gisela Marrero illustrates some
of the challenges inherent in non-relative requests for post-mortem
sperm. New Yorker Johnny Quintana had a heart attack while
watching videos on his computer.13 2 Johnny was rushed to the
hospital where he was pronounced dead. He was only thirty-one years
old and appeared to be healthy. 133 At that time, Johnny was the father
of a two-year old boy, whose mother, Gisela Marrero, had been
Johnny's girlfriend for thirteen years.134 Gisela asked the hospital to
remove and preserve Johnny's sperm, claiming that she and Johnny
had discussed having a second child.135 Johnny's mother and other
family members supported the request.136 Because the couple was not
married, however, the hospital would not act without a court order.13 7
The family was informed that Johnny's sperm would only be viable
for about thirty-six hours.'38 Racing against the clock, Gisela and
Johnny's family sought an emergency hearing before a judge. When
the judge finally issued an order granting Gisela permission to have
Johnny's sperm extracted, there were only four hours left.139 Sperm
bank operators ultimately harvested Johnny's sperm.'4 Doctors later
131 See Mary Louise Fellows, A Feminist Interpretation of the Law of Legitimacy, 7 TEX. J.
WOMEN & L. 195, 195-96 (1998) ("Very early on, the common law established the presumption
that a child born to the wife of a married man was his child unless evidence could be shown that
he had no access to his wife.").
132 See Dorian Block, Dead Man Johnny Quintana's Sperm Can't Impregnate Girlfriend,
N.Y. DAILY NEWS, Apr. 30, 2009, http://www.nydailynews.com/ny_1ocal/bronx/2009/05/01/
2009-05-01_deadmancantsiresibling-for-son.html.
13 3 See NY Woman Planning to Have Dead Lover's Child, CBS NEWS, Apr. 19, 2009,
http://www.cbsnews.com/stories/2009/04/19/ap/strange/main4955256.shtml.
14Block, supra note 132.
135 See id.
136 See id.
137 See NY Woman Planning, supra note 133.
138 See Block, supra note 132.
139 Id.
'4See id.
1178 [Vol. 60:4
2010] GRAVESIDE BIRTHDAY PARTIES 1179
concluded, however, that the sample of sperm was not adequate to
be used for artificial insemination.141 Thus, even after so much effort,
Gisela was unable to have Johnny's child.14 2
III. LAUGHING HEIRS 14 3
Living beings do not have heirs; a man's heirs are determined at
his death. This leads to the question: How should the law categorize
children that are conceived after the man's death? Laughing heirs are
relatives who are so far removed from the deceased that they do not
feel the pain of the loss. Typically, laughing heirs are distant relatives
who do not have a close connection to the decedent.'" As a result
of posthumous reproduction, a laughing heir may actually be the
biological child of the dead person. When a man dies intestate, his
children are the first ones in line to inherit his estate.145 Thus, the
existence of posthumously conceived children will clearly impact the
distribution of the estate. As a consequence of the use of posthumous
reproduction, courts may have a difficult time identifying the man's
heirs. Further, the possibility that a man may have children years after
his death denies the probate court the opportunity to finalize the
man's estate.
A. Legislative Mandates
Only eleven states have attempted to address the inheritance
rights of posthumously conceived children.14 6 Six of these states have
14 1 Id.
1 42 Id.
143 For a detailed discussion of the inheritance rights of posthumously conceived children,
see Lewis, Afterdeath Children, supra note 68.
144 JESSE DUKEMINIER, STANLEY M. JOHANSON, JAMES M. LINDGREN & ROBERT H.
SrrKOFF, WILLS, TRUSTS, AND ESTATES 81 (7th ed. 2005)
15 Joseph H. Karlin, Comment, "Daddy, Can You Spare A Dime?": Intestate Heir Rights
of Posthumously Conceived Children, 79 TEMPLE L. REV. 1317, 1338 (2006) (noting that all
states include children as heirs under their intestate statutes).
'6CAL. PROB. CODE § 249.5 (West Supp. 2010) (considering a child who is in utero
within two years of the decedent's death to be an heir for purposes of property distribution);
DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 13, § 8-707 (2007) (requiring written consent for posthumous reproduction
in order for the child to be considered an heir); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 742.17(4) (West 2007)
(providing that children conceived posthumously may only inherit if specifically provided for in
the decedent's will); LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 9:391.1 (2007) (allowing children conceived
posthumously to inherit for up to three years after the decedent's death so long as the decedent
provided written consent to the posthumous conception); N.D. CENT. CODE § 14-20-65 (2008)
(stating that the provider of genetic material is only the parent of a posthumously conceived
child if there is a record of consent having been granted prior to death); OHIO REV. CODE ANN.
§ 2105.14 (West 2006) (barring inheritance by posthumously conceived children); TEx. FAM.
CODE ANN. § 160.707 (Vernon 2008) (requiring consent from the decedent spouse before a
posthumously conceived child may be recognized as an heir); UTAH CODE ANN. § 78B-15-707
(2008) (same); VA. CODE ANN. § 20-158B (2008) (recognizing parentage in a deceased spouse
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adopted the approach taken by the Uniform Parentage Act. 14 7 The
other five states have set forth independent solutions to the
problem. 14 8 For instance, an Ohio statute specifically denies the
posthumously conceived child the opportunity to inherit from his or
her father. 14 9 In contrast, the statutes enacted in eight of the eleven
states set conditions for inheritance by posthumously conceived
children. In those states, the posthumously conceived child cannot
inherit unless the following conditions are satisfied: (1) prior to his
death, the deceased man agreed to have children conceived using his
genetic material; (2) the person advocating for the child's right to
inherit has written evidence of the deceased man's agreement; (3) the
child was conceived or born within a certain period of time after the
man's death; and (4) the woman who sought to become pregnant
using the dead man's genetic material was married to him before he
died.o50 Some, such as Louisiana, also grant the decedent's existing
heirs standing to challenge the inheritance rights of the posthumously
conceived child. 151
B. Judicial Resolutions
The lack of effective legislative action has forced courts to
determine the inheritance rights of posthumously conceived children
on a piecemeal basis.152 In order to determine whether these children
should be named as legal heirs of their fathers, courts must balance
the interests of the state, the posthumously created child, the
man's existing heirs, and the man's stated or presumed preference.' 53
only if notice of death could not feasibly have been communicated prior to the implantation or if
the spouse consented in writing to become a parent prior to implantation); WASH REV. CODE §
26.26.730 (West 2008) (permitting inheritance by posthumously conceived children where the
decedent provided written consent to use of his or her genetic material after death); WYO. STAT.
ANN. § 14-2-907 (2008) (same).
147UNIF. PARENTAGE ACr § 707 (2000). ("If a spouse dies before placement of eggs,
sperm, or embryos, the deceased spouse is not a parent of the resulting child unless the deceased
spouse consented in a record that if assisted reproduction were to occur after death, the deceased
spouse would be a parent of the child."). Those states are Delaware, North Dakota, Texas, Utah,
Washington, and Wyoming.
148 Those states are California, Florida, Louisiana, Ohio, and Virginia.
1490Hio REV. CODE ANN. § 2105.14 ("Descendants of an intestate begotten before his
death, but born thereafter, in all cases will inherit as if born in the lifetime of the intestate and
surviving him; but in no other case can a person inherit unless living at the time of the death of
the intestate.").
15oLewis, Afterdeath Children, supra note 68, at 427.
1s1 LA. CIV. CODE ANN. art. 190 (West 2007) (creating a cause of action for adversely
affected heirs to seek a disavowal of paternity).
152 See, e.g., Finley v. Astrue, 270 S.W. 3d 849 (Ark. 2008); In re Martin B., 841 N.Y.S.2d
207 (2007).
1s3 See, e.g., Woodward v. Comm'r of Soc. Sec., 760 N.E.2d 257, 260 (Mass. 2002).
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Weighing heavily in this equation is the fact that the probate process
can be time-consuming and expensive. 154 In order to preserve limited
resources, states prefer that estates are promptly finalized. This need
for finality often weighs against leaving the estate open to give the
posthumously conceived child the opportunity to be conceived and
born.155 However, most cases involved children that have already
been born. In the interest of fairness, these children should be given
the same opportunity to inherit as other classes of children.'56 On the
other hand, in reaching its decision, courts must also consider the
rights of the man's existing heirs, who should not have to wait
indefinitely to receive their inheritance.157 Their interests should also
be considered because their inheritance will inevitably be reduced by
the creation of additional heirs.15 8
The debate about the merits of posthumous reproduction is
ongoing. Regardless of the manner of their births, those children
exist.15 9 With the advent of posthumous conception, courts will
increasingly have to grapple with the difficult balancing act necessary
to adjudicate inheritance rights.
CONCLUSION
Lawyers and doctors often look at the same facts through different
lenses. Physicians seek to push the boundaries of science; attorneys
try to define those boundaries. Scientists are constantly researching
methods to enable infertile individuals and people in non-traditional
relationships to become parents. As a consequence of advances in
reproductive technology, sexual intercourse between a man and a
woman is no longer the only way to conceive children. Procedures
like artificial insemination and in vitro fertilization make it possible
for many people to have children when they otherwise would not be
154 Dennis M. Horn & Susan N. Gary, Death Without Probate: TOD Deeds-The Latest
Tool in the Toolbox, PROB. & PROP., Mar.-Apr. 2010, available at http://www.abanet.org/
rppt/publications/magazine/2010/ma/DeathWithoutProbate.pdf (outlining various reasons to
avoid probate, including its expense and courts' large probate caseload and limited funding).
15s Cf Fazilat v. Feldstein, 848 A.2d 761, 766 (N.J. 2004) (recognizing, in the context of a
claim against the decedent father's estate by the mother of a child born out of wedlock, that the
state has an interest in the prompt settlement of estates).
156 For a discussion of the inheritance rights of different classes of children, see BROWNE
LEWIS, THE INHERITANCE RIGHTS OF CHILDREN IN THE UNITED STATES (2010).
157 See Vegter, supra note 84, at 294 (addressing the need for timely estate administration).
158 Morgan Kirkland Wood, Note, It Takes a Village: Considering the Other Interests at
Stake When Extending Inheritance Rights to Posthumously Conceived Children, 44 GA. L. REV.
873, 903-04 (2010) (arguing that lawmakers must strike a balance between the rights and
interests of the decedent's other children with those of any children who are posthumously
conceived).
159 See id. at 882-89 (discussing cases involving posthumously conceived children).
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able to, and the discovery of a process to freeze the gametes of dead
people has led to the possibility of posthumous reproduction.
This Essay briefly explored three of the legal areas that have
been impacted by posthumous reproduction-parentage, procreative
freedom, and probate. As a result of reproductive technologies, the
courts have to deal with custody disputes that may involve as many as
five or six adults vying to be recognized as legal parents.'6 The
process of artificial insemination may result in two men seeking to
be named the child's legal father-the inseminated woman's husband
and the sperm donor. Further, custody disputes are no longer
limited to paternity adjudications. Because reproductive technology
now makes gestational surrogacy possible, the courts are faced with
the task of deciding which woman-the contracting woman or the
surrogate-to designate as the child's legal mother.
The availability and use of reproductive technology that makes
posthumous reproduction possible forces courts to designate legal
parents for the children conceived. Further, courts must also decide
whether dead people have reproductive rights and determine the steps
that are necessary to protect those rights. Doctors need guidance when
deciding if they should extract sperm from dead men and turn it over
to a requesting party. Once posthumously conceived children are
born, legislatures and courts must ensure that they are financially
supported. That financial support may take the form of lifetime
support, inheritance or government survival benefits.
The fact that most people are now able to become parents is a
testament to hardworking scientists and medical professionals.
Nonetheless, these advances have created more work for legal
professionals, as legislatures and courts have been slow to respond to
the consequences wrought by the existence and use of reproductive
technology. Scientists will continue to push the envelope when it
comes to reproductive technology. Legislatures and courts have to act
diligently to regulate that technology. The ability to create life from
the dead is a medical miracle that has legal consequences.
160 See In re C.K.G., 173 S.W.3d 714, 721 (Tenn. 2005) ("We now live in an era where a
child may have as many as five different 'parents.' These include a sperm donor, an egg donor,
a surrogate or gestational host, and two nonbiologically related individuals who intend to raise
the child." (quoting John Lawrence Hill, What Does It Mean To Be a "Parent"? The Claims of
Biology as the Basis for Parental Rights, 66 N.Y.U. L. REv. 353, 355 (1991))), cited in Lewis,
Two Fathers, supra note 56, at 951.
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